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AUTOMOBILE SEARCHES
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has traditionally distinguished between the search of a
residence and the search of an automobile.1 While the courts safely guard the
fourth amendment right2 when dealing with searches of residences, such protec-
tion does not appear to extend to searches of vehicles. Indeed, recent Supreme
Court decisions have practically eliminated the need for a search warrant when
a motor vehicle is the object of the search.
Since the fourth amendment requires a warrant to validly search or seize,
any time the Court upholds a search or seizure without a warrant it is carving out
an exception to the mandates of that amendment.
This paper develops the various circumstances in which the courts have
felt an exception to the warrant requirement was justified. However, it appears
that the exceptions have swallowed the rule, for when probable cause is present,
police officers have the authority to search an automobile without a warrant:
prior to an arrest; as an incident of the arrest; subsequent to the arrest when the
vehicle is in police custody; and most recently, after the arrest, even though
the vehicle is not in police custody.
I. SEARCHES PRIOR TO THE ARREST
The question of whether a particular search occurred prior to or following
an arrest is one that is not always free from doubt. There are cases in which
the court has held that an arrest takes place as soon as a car is stopped s and
consequently, classify the search as incidental to the arrest. However, the
majority of cases dealing with this issue specifically indicate that their decision
was founded on the officers' right to search based on probable cause and not
as a search incident to an arrest.
The first case recognizing the right of a police officer to conduct a warrant-
less search of an automobile based on probable cause was Carroll v. U.S.4
1 Chambers v. Moroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Preston v. U.S., 376 U.S. 364 (1964);
Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10 (1947); Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Carroll v. U.S.,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
2 The 4th amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Automobiles are personal "effects" and are thereby entitled to 4th
Amendment protection. Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
3 Henry v. U.S., 361 U.S. 98 (1959) holding that an arrest had taken place when F.B.I.
agents stopped the car, and since there was no probable cause to arrest, the subsequent
search was invalid.
4 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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The facts were, on September 29, 1921, two undercover prohibition agents
arranged to buy liquor from Carroll and Kiro in a Grand Rapids, Michigan
apartment. Carroll and Kiro left in an Oldsmobile to get the liquor somewhere
east of Grand Rapids but did not return. On December 15, two and one-half
months later, the agents saw the same Oldsmobile heading east from Grand
Rapids. Carroll and Kiro were in the car. The agents stopped the Oldsmobile on
the suspicion that it contained liquor. Under the Prohibition Act5 a first posses-
sion of liquor offense was a misdemeanor. Since the agents only suspected, but
had not seen Carroll and Kiro in possession of liquor when they stopped the car,
no misdemeanor had at that time been committed in their presence and they had
no authority to arrest the suspects. The agents, nevertheless, searched the car,
found sixty-eight bottles of liquor, and then arrested Carroll and Kiro.
The court specifically held that the search was justified on the basis of
the officers' probable cause to believe that the automobile carried contraband.
The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent
on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the
seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend
against the law. The seizure in such a proceeding comes before the
arrest.6 (Emphasis added.)
The rationale for allowing warrantless searches prior to the arrest is that
the vehicle could be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. The requirement of securing a warrant prior to the
arrest becomes impractical, and hence, the Court feels justified in making an
exception to the fourth amendment.
In another case,7 police had probable cause to believe that the occupants
of an automobile had been involved in the breaking and entering of a motel
room in which linens of the motel and a quantity of cigarettes were taken. s A
day later the officer saw the car with a motel pillowcase inside. A search of the
car without a warrant revealed a quantity of cigarettes. The court upheld the
search stating that the "officer had reasonable cause to believe that the occupants
of the automobile had been involved in a felony." 9
It is clear that before the search of the vehicle can take place, the officers
5 "When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of the law shall
discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquor in
any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to
seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to law." Act
of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (repealed 1935).
s 267 U.S. at 158-59. The Court defined the probable cause which is necessary to vali-
date a search without a warrant as "a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known
to the .... officer" that a crime has been committed. Id. at 149.
7 People v. Harrington, 14 Mich. App. 298, 165 N.W.2d 275 (1968).
8 The reasonable cause here was the officers' knowledge of a co-defendant who had
rented the motel room and the identity of the car registered to the room.
9 14 Mich. App. at 299, 165 N.W.2d at 276,
CHICAGO-KENT LAIF REVIEW
must have probable cause to believe that contraband will be found therein. 10
Mere suspicion is not sufficient to justify a warrantless search. 1
In State v. Valentin,12 two police officers saw defendant at 1:45 A.M. when
he parked his car and entered a tavern which closes at 2:00 A.M. The police
officers, having seen defendant go into the tavern and not recognizing him,
approached the parked vehicle. While one of the officers watched the defendant
through the tavern window, the other started a search of defendant's car. He
found a shotgun and shotgun shells under the driver's seat. The defendant
was thereupon arrested as he left the tavern and charged with carrying a con-
cealed weapon.
The court held that the search was unconstitutional; that the probable
cause which is necessary to validate a search without a warrant was absent.
Thus, under what has become known as the "Carroll exception" to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement, warrantless searches made prior to an
arrest are valid. Two essential elements, however, must first be found: (1) the
officers must have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contra-
band and; (2) the vehicle must be readily movable so that it is not "reasonably
practicable" to secure a search warrant.' 3
II. SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
Unlike the preceding discussion where the right to conduct a warrantless
automobile search prior to arrest was based on the officers' probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contained items subject to seizure, in this section, the
right to conduct a warrantless search is based solely upon the right to arrest.
In general, the justification for such a search is predicated on: the right to
protect the officer from concealed weapons; the prevention of the arrestee's
escape; and the prevention of the destruction of evidence within the arrestee's
immediate control.
1 4
A. Historical Development of the Right to Search Incident to Arrest
The first decision by the Supreme Court which gave any indication of the
extent of an incidental search was Weeks v. U.S.,15 where the court suggested
10 Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
11 Note that under today's standards, the facts in the Carroll case would probably fall
short of probable cause.
12 74 NJ. Super. 502, 181 A.2d 551 (1962).
Is See, e.g. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1945) ; Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 251 (1938) ; Husty v. United States 282 U.S. 694 (1931); U.S. v. Prince, 301 F.2d 558
(6th Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Murray, 51 F.2d 516 (D. Mo. 1931) ; United States v. Scala,
209 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Pa. 1962) ; United States v. Wise, 190 F. Supp. 615 (D. Md. 1961);
Durham v. Hayes, 258 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Mo. 1966), aff'd 368 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Littlejohn, 260 F. Supp. 278 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) ; Burnett v. State, 201 Ind.
134, 166 N.E. 430 (1925).
'4 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
15 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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there is a right to search the arrestee's person.16 The Weeks decision made no
mention of the right to search the area where the arrest occurred, but limited
the scope of the search to the person of the arrestee.
In Agnello v. U.S.17 the Court held unreasonable a search of defendant's
house made after the defendant had been arrested and taken into custody. The
search of the house was not substantially contemporaneous in time and place
with the arrest, and therefore, not incidental to it. The court, however, did say
that the right to search the house, had it been contemporaneous with the arrest,
was not doubted. 18
In Marron v. U.S. 19 officers searched a building pursuant to a search warrant
authorizing seizure of intoxicating liquors and articles used in their manufacture.
In a closet they found incriminating documents. The defendant was not on the
premises but the officers arrested one of defendant's partners. Although the
warrant did not authorize seizure of the documents, the seizure was justified as
an incident to arrest of defendant's partner. The officers "had a right without a
warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize things
used to carry on the criminal enterprise. ' 20 Thus, the search could now be
extended beyond the room where the arrest was made.
In Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U.S.,21 decided two years after Marron, the
court held unlawful a broad search of defendant's business office which was
allegedly incident to an arrest. The court viewed the search as excessive in
scope and held that since the officers had ample time and information to swear
out a valid warrant, they should have done so.
22
A decision which broadened the scope of incidental searches was Harris
v. U.S.23 In Harris, F.B.I. Agents acting on the authority of a valid arrest warrant,
arrested defendant in his four room apartment for forgery. They then spent
the next five hours searching his entire apartment for evidence of the forgery.
Their search turned up altered draft cards which were concededly unrelated to
16 "What then, is the present case? . . . It is not an assertion of the right on the
part of the government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the
person of the accused when legally arrested, to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of
crime." Id. at 392.
17 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
Is "The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully
arrested while committing crime and to search the place where the arrest is made in order
to find and seize things connected with crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was
committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to
be doubted." Id. at 30.
19 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
20 Id. at 199.
21 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
22 Id. at 358. See also U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) holding unreasonable a
search of desk drawers and a cabinet incident to a lawful arrest. The Court distinguished
Marron on the ground that the Marron search was limited in scope while here there was a
"general exploratory search" in hope that evidence of a crime might be found.
28 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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the purpose of the arrest. Defendant's conviction for unlawful possession of draft
board papers was upheld, with the court concluding that the search was not
a general exploration.
24
A year after Harris, however, the court once again began to limit the scope
of warrantless searches incidental to an arrest. In the case of Trupiano v. U.S."
federal agents raided an illegal liquor distillery without search or arrest war-
rants. They arrested one defendant who was operating the still, searched the
entire premises, and seized contraband. In holding the search unreasonable,
the Court announced the "rule of practicability": "It is a cardinal rule that,
in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search
warrants whenever reasonably practicable.
'26
The rule of practicability "rests upon the desirability of having magistrates
rather than police officers determine when searches and seizures are permissible
and what limitations should be placed upon such activities. '27 Making an arrest
on the premises searched does not alone give police the right to search. "The test
is the apparent need for summary seizure .... ,,28 Thus, the mere fact that there
is a valid arrest does not legalize a search or seizure without a warrant.
The rule of practicability, however, was overruled two years later in U.S.
v. Rabinowitz. 29 The new test announced by the Court looks not to the practi-
cability of obtaining a warrant, but to the reasonableness of the search.
To the extent that Trupiano v. U.S. .. .requires a search warrant
solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather than
on the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case
is overruled. The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure
a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion
in turn depends upon the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere
of the case.80
The weakness of the Rabinowitz test became clear: what is reasonable;
what are the standards by which reasonableness is determined?
It was this inherent vagueness that led the Court, in Chimel v. California
3 1
to directly overrule the reasonableness test.
The new standard is simple, precise and easy to apply. Officers may search
"the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control." The "area
within his immediate control" was construed to mean the area from within which
the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
3 2
Whether this present standard would apply to vehicle searches as well as to
24 Id. at 153.
25 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
26 Id. at 705.
27 Id. at 705.
28 Id. at 708.
29 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
30 Id. at 66 (Emphasis added.)
81 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
82 Id. at 763.
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searches of residences, however, was ambiguous. The reason for this ambiguity
was that the court relied on one automobile search case to support its decision,"
while finding another vehicular search situation inapplicable.
8 4
While some writers felt the Chimel decision would apply to auto searches,
5
it appears from recent statements by the court that Chimel will be strictly applied
only to searches of residences.
36
B. Searches Incident to Automobile Arrests
The scope of the automobile search must be considered to remain unaf-
fected by the Chimel decision. Hence, police officers have the authority to search
the entire vehicle as an incident to an arrest.
An arrest must be for something more than a mere traffic violation, as a
search growing from a traffic violation would never be authorized because there
can be no "fruits" of such a crime.8 7 But, when the police, after stopping for a
traffic violation, have reason to believe they are dealing with more than just a
traffic violator, a search may, based upon that belief, be conducted. 8
The police may not use the arrest as a pretext to search for evidence of
other crimes. In Amador-Gonzalez v. U.., 39 defendant was stopped for making
an improper left turn, speeding and failing to have a drivers license. An incidental
search revealed narcotics. Prior to the arrest, detectives from the Narcotics
Division of the El Paso Police Department had been watching Gonzalez, suspect-
ing that he had been transporting narcotics. At the hearing to suppress the
33 Preston v. U.S., 376 U.S. 364, is cited to support the contention that incidental
searches are justified to protect the officer, to prevent an escape of the suspect, and to pre-
vent the destruction of evidence.
34 The Court citing Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925) states: "Our holding today is
of course entirely consistent with the recognized principle that, assuming the existence of
probable cause, automobiles and other vehicles may be searched without warrants where it
is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
35 See Warrantless Searches in Light of Chimel: A Return to the Original Understand-
ing, 11 Ariz. L. Rev. 457 (1969) ; Murray, Aitken, Constitutional Limitations on Automobile
Searches, 3 Loyola UL Rev (L.A.) 95 (1970) ; Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock
to Vehicle Searches, 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 626 (1970). The dissent in Chimel points out that
the reasons for the Carroll exception, i.e., that the evidence can be destroyed or moved out of
the jurisdiction, are also present here, if the police are required to leave the scene of an
arrest in order to obtain a search warrant and there is "a clear danger that the items for
which they may reasonably search will be removed before they return with a warrant." 395
U.S. 752, 774.
86 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970). "... our past decisions make clear that only
in a 'few specifically established and well-delineated' situations . . . may a warrantless
search of a dwelling withstand constitutional scrutiny," citing Chimel (emphasis added)
Chambers v. Moroney, 399 U.S. 42; "Nothing said last term in Chimel v. California . . .
purported to modify or affect the rationale of Carroll." at 51, n.8. See also U.S. v. Brown,
432 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1970).
37 Halko v. Anderson, 244 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1965), af'd per curiam 359 F.2d 435
(3rd Cir. 1966), cert. den. 382 U.S. 1011; People v. Reed, 36 Il1. 2d 358; 227 N.E.2d 69
(1967) ; Courington v. State, 74 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1954) ; People v. Thomas, 31 11. 2d
272, 201 N.E.2d 413 (1964).
8 People v. Tate, 38 Ill. 2d 184, 230 N.E.2d 697 (1967).
89 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
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evidence, the detective testified that "he wanted to search he car, that is why
[he] wanted to reach" the defendant. 40 The search was held invalid; the officer
could not use the traffic violation as a pretext for a search.
While it has generally been said that a search to be incidental to an arrest,
must be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and confined to the im-
mediate vicinity of the arrest,41 the cases dealing with vehicular searches are
ambiguous.
In Preston v. U.S.,42 defendant was arrested on a charge of vagrancy while
he was sitting in his car. His car was thereafter towed to the police station garage
and searched. From evidence found therein, the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to rob a bank.
The Supreme Court, in holding the search invalid said that "where a search
is remote in time or place from the arrest ...and the accused is under arrest
and in custody, a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not
incident to the arrest.
'43
C. l1 the Car Is in Police Custody
Subsequent cases have strictly limited the principle enunciated in Preston,
holding it applicable solely to searches incident to arrest. If a delayed search can
be upheld on any other grounds, Preston simply does not apply. 44
For example, in Cooper v. California,45 the defendant was arrested for
selling heroin to a police informer. After arresting Cooper, the police impounded
his car for forfeiture proceedings. 46 A week later, while both the defendant and
his automobile where still in custody, the police conducted a warrantless search
of the car in the police garage. The search yielded a piece of brown paper bag
which was later introduced into evidence against the defendant. In his appeal to
the Supreme Court, Cooper relied on Preston, claiming the search was invalid
and that the use of the evidence was reversible error. The court, however, upheld
the search. Preston was distinguished as governing only searches incident to
arrest, and the Court held that the subsequent search here was reasonable and
valid. The fact that both the defendant's arrest and seizure of his car stemmed
from the same violation was emphasized. Furthermore, since the car was to be
40 Id. at 313.
41 Preston v. U.S., 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Agnello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
42 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
43 Id. at 367; Agnello v. U.S. 269 U.S. 20, at 31.
44 As to the validity of a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest
effected by a delay in conducting the search at a different place than vicinity of arrest, see
Modern Status of Rule as to Validity of Non-Consensual Search and Seizure Made Without
Warrant After Lawful Arrest as Affected by Lapse of Time Between, or Difference in Places
of, Arrest and Search, and cases cited therein; Anno. 19 A.LR.3d 727 (1968).
45 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
46 The impounding was authorized by a California statute allowing seizure and for.
feiture of any vehicle used in illegal transportation of narcotics. Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 60 (1967).
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held until the forfeiture proceedings were complete, it would be unreasonable
to prohibit the police from inspecting the vehicle as a precautionary measure.
Preston was arrested for vagrancy, a crime which can have no "fruits," while
the police had in Cooper probable cause to believe evidence of the crime for
which he was arrested would be found in the car.
The principle that has evolved from Cooper, then, is that if the police have
custody of the car and probable cause to believe that instruments or fruits of the
crime for which defendant was arrested will be found, a search without a warrant
will not offend the constitutional requirements of the fourth amendment.
III. SEARCH AFTER ARREST BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE
The Supreme Court appears to have added a new dimension to warrantless
searches of automobiles in the recent case of Chambers v. Moroney.47 It seems
that as a result of this opinion, the police can now conduct a warrantless search
of an automobile subsequent to an arrest, when the vehicle is not in police
custody, if they have probable cause to believe that fruits of the crime for which
the defendant was arrested will be found.
The facts are substantially as follows. During the night of May 20, 1963,
a service station was robbed. Two teenagers earlier had noticed a blue compact
station wagon circling the block in the vicinity of the service station and then
saw the station wagon speed away from a parking lot near the service station.
When they learned of the robbery they reported to the police that four men
were in the car; that one was wearing a green sweater and another was wearing
a trench coat. This information was broadcasted over the police radio.
Within an hour, a car answering the description, carrying four men was
stopped; petitioner was one of the men in the car. He was wearing a green
sweater. The occupants were arrested and the car was driven to the police station.
After interrogating the defendants, the police went outside to search the car,
found nothing, and again continued in the interrogation of the defendants. Then,
for a second time, the police conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle.
This time, however, the police found two revolvers under the dashboard, and
cards bearing the name of a service station attendant who had been robbed a week
earlier. This evidence was introduced at trial, and petitioner was convicted. The
Supreme Court of the United States held the search was valid.
The opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice White, recognized that the search could
not be justified as a search incident to an arrest.48 The court further acknowl-
edged that Cooper is inapplicable for "no claim is made that state law authorized
that the station wagon be held as evidence or as an instrumentality of the
crime."1
49
47 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
48 Id. at 47.
49 Id. at 49.
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Therefore, the court had to turn its attention to the Carroll exception in
order to uphold the validity of the search.
It will be remembered that Carroll was the first case to make an exception
to the warrant requirements of the fourth amendment. Under Carroll when
probable cause exists to believe that contraband is located in an automobile, and
if the vehicle is readily movable, a warrantless search prior to arrest can be made.
The rationale used in sustaining the search in Chambers was that since
the automobile could have been searched when it was stopped, there being
probable cause to search and the car being readily movable, the probable cause
factor still existed at the police station when the car was still available to be
moved.
The opinion recognized that "arguably" the car should be seized and then
a search warrant obtained; that "only the 'lesser' intrusion is permissible until
a magistrate authorizes the 'greater.' "0 However, which is the "greater" and
which is the "lesser" intrusion is "a debatable question" and is left unanswered.
As far as the Court is concerned, "for constitutional purposes we see no dif-
ference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting
the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an
immediate search without a warrant."
51
It can hardly be doubted that the Chambers decision greatly expands the
Carroll exception and, in effect, dispenses with the requirements of a search
warrant in automobile cases.
Carroll, and each of the court's decisions upholding a warrantless search
on its authority involved a search for contraband. 52 This is the first decision
that has expanded Carroll "to authorize a general search of a vehicle for evi-
dence of crime without a warrant, in every case where probable cause exists.
'53
As to which would be the "greater" or "lesser" intrusions, seizing until
a warrant can be obtained or searching without a warrant, Mr. Justice Harlan
notes in his dissenting opinion5 4 that very often the probable cause to search
will justify arrest and since the occupants of the car are in custody (as they were
in the present situation), they will suffer only minimal further inconvenience
by immobilization of the vehicle until a warrant can be obtained. Yet, rather
than decide which is the "greater" and which is the "lesser," the Court authorizes
both.
The cases which have developed exceptions to the warrant requirement have
always been decided to accommodate the exigencies of the particular situation.
50 Id. at 51.
51 Id. at 52.
52 Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160 (1949) ; Scher v. U.S., 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v.
U.S., 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
5S Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 63.
54 Id. at 63-64.
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The Carroll exception is justified as reasonable because the automobile, unless
stopped on the highway, may never be found again if the officers must first obtain
a warrant.
However, the situation presented in Chambers is vastly different. Unlike
Carroll, the automobile is no longer stopped on the highway, but parked outside
the police station, with the owner and occupants safely in police custody. The
exigency permitting the immediate search on the highway is absent. Indeed, here
the police searched, went away, then returned some time later, and conducted
another search. By the holding of this court, the police are authorized to take the
car to the police station and at their convenience conduct a warrantless search.
This decision will certainly make moot any arguments that might have
existed as to the scope of a search incident to arrest. 55 When does an incidental
search stop and the Chambers type search begin? In U.S. v. Brown56 decided
October 5, 1970, a search of defendant's automobile was conducted without a
warrant after the defendants had been arrested and placed in custody in a
nearby police vehicle. The court stated: "Although we once might have had some
question concerning the admissibility of evidence obtained in such a manner,
the Supreme Court's most recent opinion on this issue quiets all doubts which
we might have entertained.
'57
IV. CONCLUSION
Chambers completes the continuum for warrantless searches of automobiles.
The police can now search if there is probable cause prior to the arrest,58 as an
incident to a lawful arrest, 59 when the vehicle is in police custody, 60 and
finally, subsequent to the arrest, when the vehicle is not in police custody.
With this allowable breadth of authority, it seems that only in the rarest of
circumstances would a police officer bother to appear before a magistrate and
present his evidence of probable cause. In effect, warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles are completely authorized.
PHILLIP ALLEN YAFFA
55 Supra note 35 and accompanying text material
56 432 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1970).
5T Id. at 553 citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
58 Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
59 Agnelo v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
E Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
